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Abstract— A variety of wireless technologies have been
standardized and commercialized, but no single solution is
considered the best to satisfy all communication needs due
to different coverage and bandwidth limitations. Therefore,
internetworking between heterogeneous wireless networks
is extremely important for ubiquitous and high perfor-
mance wireless communications. The security problem is
one of the major challenges in internetworking. To date,
most research on internetwork authentication has focused
on centralized authentication approaches, where the home
network participates in each authentication process. For
high latency between the home and visiting networks, such
approaches tend to be inefficient. In this paper, we describe
chained authentication, which requires collaboration be-
tween adjacent networks without involvement of the home
network. After categorizing chained protocols, we propose
a novel design of chained authentication methods under
3G-WLAN internetworking. The experiments show that
proactive context transfer and ticket forwarding reduce the
3G authentication latency to 36.8% and WLAN EAP-TLS
latency to 23.1% when RTT between visiting and home
networks is 200 ms.
Index Terms— System design, Experimentation with
Testbed
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technology spans from Wire-
less Personal Area Networks (WPAN), such as blue-
tooth [1], to 3G Wireless Wide Area Networks, such as
CDMA2000 and UMTS. Despite the variety of wireless
technologies, no single solution is considered the best
to satisfy all communication needs because of differ-
ent coverage and bandwidth limitations. For example,
3G networks provide widespread coverage with limited
bandwidth, up to 2 Mbps. However, WLAN provides
high bandwidth, up to 54 Mbps, with relatively smaller
coverage. For ubiquitous and high performance wireless
networking services, the internetworking between wire-
less networks is extremely important. Most internetwork-
ing studies have been dedicated to the integration of 3G
and WLAN (see [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7]).
Security is one of the major challenges in internet-
working. When the mobile station (MS) switches the
connectivity to a different network, due to mobility or
bandwidth demand, the mobile station and the network
have to authenticate each other for secure communica-
tions1. However, the authentication process required by
each network tends to be complicated and costly. For ex-
ample, the GSM technical specification on performance
requirements [8] assumes that the MS responds to an
authentication request from the network in just under 1
second. In 802.11, EAP-TLS authentication takes about
800 ms [9]. Long authentication delays can cause a
disruption of service that is noticeable to users.
Most research on internetwork authentication assumes
that the visiting network should collaborate with the
home network [6] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14], called cen-
tralized methods. In centralized methods, exchanging
messages between the visiting network and the home net-
work is inevitable for each authentication process. Fig. 1
illustrates a typical sequence of messages in centralized
methods. Due to high latency between visiting and home
networks, the authentication latency in visiting networks
tends to be unacceptably high.
This paper describes a novel approach for designing
fast internetwork authentication, called chained authen-
tication methods. Unlike centralized methods, chained
authentication is a distributed method in which authenti-
cation at a new network relies on the authentication at a
previous network. Thus, chained methods do not require
message exchanges with the home network (Fig. 2).
1Without loss of generality, we assume one network is controlled
by one authentication server. Therefore, network refers to a domain
or realm.
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Fig. 1. Centralized Method for Internetwork Authentication
Assume {N1, N2, . . . , Nm} is a network level mobility
path, where N1 is the home network (or the client is
authenticated to N1 through the home server). In chained
authentication methods, the results of the authentication
process in network Ni, such as credentials, become part
of the input to the authentication process in network
Ni+1. We categorize the chained authentication methods
into proactive context transfer, reactive context transfer,
and ticket forwarding. Fig. 2 shows the mobility path
under proactive context transfer. To enable proactive
context transfer, we propose a soft-prediction system
by extending neighbor graph for the internetwork en-
vironment [15] [16]. The main advantage of the chained
authentication approach is performance because authen-
tication requires message deliveries no farther than the
adjacent networks.
The contributions of our work are (i) a proposal for
chained authentication methods as a fast and secure
internetwork authentication framework, (ii) a categoriza-
tion of chained authentication methods, and (iii) novel
designs of each chained method category under 3G-
WLAN internetworking, as well as a comparison of their
performance by experiment.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: We
give background on wireless authentication methods
in section II, and describe the chained authentication
framework in section III. We propose novel designs for
chained methods under 3G and WLAN internetwork-
ing in section IV, and present experimental results for
these designs in section V. Section VI describes a soft-
prediction scheme to assist the chained methods. Section
VII describes related work, and we conclude in section
VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief review of the
authentication protocols in 3G and IEEE 802.11. The
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Fig. 2. Chained Method for Internetwork Authentication
two major 3G systems, UMTS and CDMA2000, adopted
the same authentication protocol, AKA (Authentication
and Key Agreement) 2. Thus, we present AKA as the
representative authentication protocol for 3G systems.
For the authentication in 802.11 network, we assume
that the network follows 802.11i RSN (Robust Secure
Network) standard.
A. 3G Authentication - AKA
The AKA protocol was developed by fixing and
expanding GSM’s authentication method. AKA provides
mutual authentication between the mobile station and the
network. It also distributes cryptographic keys from the
network to the mobile station.
The AKA procedure have two stages (Fig. 3).
In the first stage, HLR/AC (Home Location Regis-
ter/Authentication Center) transfers security credentials
(in an authentication vector, AV) to VLR (Visitor Lo-
cation Register) for voice traffic, or to PDSN (Packet
Data Serving Node) for packet-switched traffic. The
distribution of AV’s should be protected by IPsec or
an equivalently strong mechanism. An AV consists of
RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN, and optional UAK. HLR
first generates RAND and derives XRES, CK, IK, and
AUTN using the master key K as follows,
XRES = f2(K,RAND)
CK = f3(K,RAND)
IK = f4(K,RAND)
AUTN = SQN ⊕AK||AMF ||MAC
MAC = f1(K,SQN ||RAND||AMF )
AK = f5(K,RAND)
UAK = f11(K).
2CDMA2000 uses a slightly modified AKA which includes addi-
tional credential, UAK, to protect bogus shell problem [17].
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Fig. 3. AKA: Authentication in 3G (UMTS and CDMA2000)
where f1, . . . , f5, and f11 are hash functions defined
in the standard [18].
In the derivation of AUTN, the HLR uses a sequence
number SQN to protect against replay attacks, and AK
(Anonymity Key) is xor-ed with SQN to avoid identity
tracking by observing SQN. AMF is an information field.
In the second stage, MS and VLR authenticate each
other through challenge-response exchanges. First, the
MS retrieves SQN from AUTN message as follows,
SQN = SQN ⊕AK ⊕ f5(K,RAND).
Then MS checks if SQN is in a valid range. If this
check fails, MS initiates a re-synchronization process.
If SQN is valid, then MS authenticates the network by
checking the MAC field of AUTN as
MAC == f1(K,SQN ||RAND||AMF ).
Once verified, MS calculates and sends RES to VLR.
RES = f4(K,RAND)
Now, VLR can verify if MS has the correct master
key K by simply comparing RES with XRES from AV.
Once verified, VLR uses CK and IK in AV for the secure
channel. Meanwhile, with RAND from HLR and K, MS
can calculate CK and IK, thus establishing the secure
wireless channel.
B. WLAN Authentication - EAP-TLS
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), the suggested se-
curity feature in the original IEEE Standard 802.11,
is insecure [19] [20]. To amend this situation, IEEE
standard work group 802.11i [21] has been working
on a new security solution for 802.11 WLAN, called
RSN (Robust Security Network). In RSN authentication,
there are three entities: supplicant, authenticator and
authentication server (AS). The supplicant is the user
system that wants to access the network, such as a
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Fig. 4. EAP-TLS message diagram
mobile station. The AS is the entity that authenticates the
supplicant. RADIUS [22] server is a de facto standard
for AS’s. The authenticator facilitates authentication be-
tween supplicant and AS. In this paper, we assume that
the authenticator is in the access points (AP).
RSN relies on IEEE standard 802.1x, a port based
network access control. In 802.1x, any packet from the
supplicant is not allowed to the network, except EAP
packets, until the authentication procedure ends with
success. 802.1x uses IETF EAP (Extensible Authentica-
tion Protocol [23]), originally designed for PPP dial-up
connections. Over EAP, any challenge-response upper-
layer authentication method can be used, such as TLS
[24], Kerberos [25], LEAP (Lightweight-EAP) or PEAP
(Protected-EAP). In this paper, we choose TLS over
EAP (or EAP-TLS [26]) as the representative 802.11
authentication scheme. EAP-TLS is already commonly
implemented for WLAN. Also, TLS is resilient to man-
in-the-middle attacks and supports explicit mutual au-
thentication using certificates from the supplicant and
AS.
Fig. 4 shows the typical message flow of a success-
ful EAP-TLS authentication. The supplicant and server
exchange their random numbers and certificates. They
authenticate each other by certificates and generate a 48
byte master key, MK. From MK, the client and the server
generate session keys as follows,
SK = PRF128(MK, ”client EAP encryption”,
clientHello.random||serverHello.random)
The first half of SK is used for encryption and the
second half is used for message authentication key.
III. THE CHAINED AUTHENTICATION FOR
INTERNETWORKING
Based on hop-by-hop trust associations between visit-
ing networks, chained authentication provides a general
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framework for secure and fast internetwork authentica-
tions. Unlike central approaches, chained authentication
is a distributed method in which the authentication
at the next foreign network relies on the success of
authentication only at the previous network. In this
section, we clarify the important assumptions of chained
authentication and classify possible designs.
A. Assumptions
Assume {N1, N2, . . . , Nm}, all visiting networks, is a
mobility path of the client MS . When the client hands
off from Ni to Ni+1, network Ni is called previous net-
work and Ni+1 is called next network. The home network
of MS should be the involved with the authentication
process in N1, the first visiting network.
For chained authentication to work, adjacent pairs of
networks, Ni and Ni+1, should hold a trust relationship.
By trust, we mean that Ni+1 believes that Ni provides
Ni+1 with correct information and that the authentication
system and confidentiality of cryptographic keys of Ni is
secure. Also, a secure channel between trusted networks
exists.
Note that if the security of Ni is compromised, sub-
sequent sessions in the following networks can be also
compromised.
B. Classification
In general, the authentication process takes the fol-
lowing steps. To authenticate each other, the client and
the authentication server exchange some messages and
verify the knowledge of secret information that is known
to only themselves. Typical exchanged messages include
random challenges. After verification (or as a result of
the verification), they generate fresh, non-repeating and
secret credentials such as session keys. Note that the
generated session keys appear random to everybody ex-
cept the client and authentication server, i.e. no attacker
can predict the secret key better than random guessing.
Moreover, client and server share the session key, and
the server only needs to give a hash of the key to the
next server so that the next server and the client share
the same secret key without any message exchanges
involved.
In this section, we introduce two criteria for chained
authentication methods, and we derive three categories
based on those criteria.
1) context transfer or ticket forwarding: We define
context as the secret material of the previous network, or
a hash of it, which enables the next network to establish
a security association with the client without having
to perform the entire authentication protocol from the
scratch [27]. Either the authentication server can deliver
the context directly, or the client can deliver the context
via ticket. The first method, called context transfer,
requires a secure channel between servers, usually over
the wire. In the second method, called ticket forwarding,
the previous network Ni issues a ticket to the client. The
ticket contains the context and expiration time, encrypted
so that only receiving network Ni+1 can decrypt. The
client receives the ticket from Ni, and tenders it to Ni+1.
Kerberos is an example of an authentication system that
also makes use of tickets [25]. The following describes
how a ticket is issued and forwarded.
Denote client, previous AS, and next AS as c, p, and
n, respectively. Let c and p share secret key Kc,p as a
result of authentication, and let p and n share Kp,n. The
ticket delivery protocol looks as follows :
p −→ c : EKc,p(n, Texp) || ticket (1)
c −→ n : ticket
where ticket = EKp,n(c, Texp, CR), CR is the
credential delivered, Texp is ticket expiration time and
EKp,n() is an encryption procedure using secret key
Kp,n.
2) reactive or proactive context transfer: The criteria
in this section only apply to context transfer as described
above. If the transfer happens before the hand-off, it’s
called proactive. When proactive transfer is not allowed,
reactive context transfer can be requested to Ni by Ni+1
after the client hand-off. It is obvious that the proactive
method requires fewer authentication messages than the
reactive one. However, to know which network will be
next network prior to hand-off, the proactive method
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Fig. 6. Proactive Context Transfer To 3G-AKA
requires some prediction mechanism. We discuss this
problem in section VI. With reactive method, even if
the client left the network, the server should keep the
client’s credentials in its cache for some time during
which the next network may request for transfer.
3) categories: Based on the aforementioned two cri-
teria, we can categorize chained authentication methods
as follows,
i) Proactive context transfer
ii) Reactive context transfer
iii) Ticket forwarding
The Fig. 5 illustrates the categorization. In the figure,
The number in parentheses represents the sequence of
events.
4) number of security associations: In centralized
methods, since each visiting network should maintain se-
curity associations with all other home networks, O(N 2)
number of security associations are required where there
are N different networks. However, under chained au-
thentication methods, the number of trust relationships
required is O(N) without dedicated central authority
such as AAA-broker [10] or identity providers [28]. The
reason is the following. Let a graph G =< V,E >
be the neighbor graph between networks where V is
the set of N networks and E is the set of edges.
Since each node need to maintain security associations
only with adjacent nodes, the total number of security
associations is the number of edges, |E|. Assuming that
the maximum degree is bounded by a constant e [16],
O(|E|) = O(eN) = O(N).
IV. DESIGN OF CHAINED AUTHENTICATION METHOD
UNDER 3G/WLAN INTERWORKING
In this section, we provide the design of chained
authentication protocols under 3G and WLAN, which
fall into aforementioned categories. We assume 3G and
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Fig. 7. Proactive Context Transfer To WLAN(EAP-TLS)
WLAN authenticate clients by AKA and EAP-TLS,
respectively.
A. Proactive Context Transfer
1) Toward 3G: Figure 6 illustrates a proactive context
transfer when the destination network is a 3G system. As
a result of authentication, AAAp (previous AAA server)
and c (client) share several secret materials that are
known only to themselves. For example, when previous
network is WLAN, the client and AAAp share a 48 byte
master key, and encryption and MAC keys of 32 bytes for
each direction. After authentication, AAAp generates the
secret key (K) and random number (RAND) as follows,
CRnew = PRF256(CRold, ”3G context”, c,Nnew)
K = CRnew[0...127]
RAND = CRnew[128...255]
where CRold represents the concatenation of one or
more credentials from previous authentication, Nnew is
the identification of the destination network, and c is
the client’s identification, such as IMSI (International
Mobile Subscriber identity). After receiving c, K and
RAND, 3G-AS (the authentication server of destination
3G system) computes CK , IK , AUTN , and XRES.
Note that AMF , AK and SQN is not sent even though
they are needed for generation of AUTN because the
3G-AS can pick them on its own3. After the client hands
off to network Nnew, it computes MK and RAND,
derives RES, and provides RES to 3G-AS along with
a registration request. 3G-AS, who already has XRES,
verifies RES from the client and sends AUTN as a
proof of authenticity. After client succeeds in verifying
AUTN , a secure channel is established.
3AK can be any user-dependent random number and AMF can
be set by 3G-AS. If the previous network is 3G, SQN can be also
sent to avoid synchronization failure. Even if the previous network is
non-3G, 3G-AS can avoid synchronization problem by using a new
array index. See Annex C in [29]
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2) Toward WLAN: Figure 7 illustrates a proactive
context transfer when the destination network is a
WLAN system. EAP-TLS supports the resume process
which allows the server and the client to skip master
key generation and to resume a previously established
association. The TLS session resume requires a 48 byte
master key (MK) and 32 byte session ID (sessionID),
generated as follows:
CRnew = PRF640(CRold, ”WLAN context”, c,Nnew)
MK = CRnew[0...384]
RAND = CRnew[389...639]
Before the hand-off, MK and sessionID is trans-
ferred to the new network. When the client requests
the resumed session with the clientHello message,
the WLAN-AAA server can identify the requested
sessionID from its cache and allow the client to resume
the previous session.
B. Reactive Context Transfer
Reactive context transfers are almost identical to
proactive ones except for the timing of the transfer and
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the initiating party. The context is identical to proactive
case. After MS hands off to the new network, the new
network’s authentication server requests the previous
network to send the context for the MS. For message
diagrams of the reactive cases, see figures 8 and 9.
C. Ticket Forwarding
The context included in the ticket is also identical to
context transfer methods. The created context CRnew is
included in a ticket, whose construction is in equation
(1) in section III-B, and forwarded. We assume that
the ticket is tendered to the next authentication server
in registration request for 3G (Fig. 10) and in EAP-
Response Identity message for WLAN system (Fig. 11),
respectively.
D. Trade-off between performance and security
Although our schemes use specific contexts, such
as (K,RAND) for 3G and (MK,SessionID) for
WLAN, many other choices for context exist, each
with their own performance and security tradeoffs. For
example, the context could be a fresh session key for
the new secure channel. The resulting scheme requires
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Fig. 12. Testbed configuration
no authentication protocol, resulting in a very fast hand-
off. However, it requires an unusually strong trust re-
lationship between networks – highly unlikely between
different business domains. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, the destination network may not trust the pre-
vious network much at all, and require that a compromise
of the previous session, or context, cannot pose a threat
to security at the destination network. For this purpose,
the destination network would have to possess a pre-
shared secret key with the client, which is possible
under multi-homed environment. The schemes proposed
in this paper require moderate trust relationship between
networks, provide moderate performance gain, and are
suitable for single-homed clients.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We implemented the chained authentication algo-
rithms discussed in section IV to simulate 3G-WLAN
internetwork authentication on an indoor 802.11b wire-
less network. Below, we present the testbed setup, imple-
mentation, measurement methodology, and experimental
results.
A. Testbed
We present the testbed for our experiment in figure 12.
The three AAA servers simulate authentication servers
at the home network (HomeAS), 3G network (3G-VLR)
and WLAN network (WLAN-AAA). 3G base stations
are simulated by 802.11b access points. Using NIST
Net emulator [30], we set the RTTs (Round Trip Time)
between servers as shown in the figure (with standard de-
viation of 2ms) to simulate the distance between different
networks4. Table I shows the hardware specifications of
the testbed.
4[31] and [32] used 100ms to 200ms for RTT between Foreign
Agent and Home Agent in Mobile IP
TABLE I
TESTBED HARDWARE CONFIGURATION
Entity Processor Mem OS
MS AMD 1.3 GHz 512 MB Linux
AP AMD 133 MHz 64 MB OpenBSD
HomeAS P-III 800 MHz 128 MB Linux
3G-VLR P-III 933 MHz 512 MB Linux
WLAN-AAA P-III 550 MHz 128 MB Linux
B. Implementation
We emulate 3G authentication over 802.11b by im-
plementing 3G-AKA protocol over EAP5. We imple-
mented cryptographic functions such as f0, f1, etc, from
the sample implementation in [18]. The mobile station
runs a modified version of Open1x Xsupplicant [33]
on Linux 2.4.25. The modifications include client-side
AKA implementation, and the ability to store contexts
and tickets for chained authentication. The AP and BS
run Open1x authenticator on OpenBSD 3.3 [33]. The
authentication servers run a modified FreeRADIUS on
Linux 2.4.18. These modifications include the ability to
transfer contexts between AS’s in proactive or reactive
authentication, to issue and decrypt tickets, to perform
TLS resume, and to perform the server-side AKA state
machine.
C. Measurement
For original (centralized) authentication, we per-
formed 60 hand-offs each for 100 ms, 150 ms , 200 ms,
and 250 ms latency settings between 3G-VLR/WLAN-
AAA and HomeAS. For each chained authentication
algorithm, we performed 60 hand-offs between 3G and
WLAN networks. We measured the authentication laten-
cies by sniffing the wireless medium and by capturing
RADIUS packets between servers using tcpdump [34].
Computation overhead was measured by internal time
loggings.
D. Results
In this section, we analyze the experimental results
with respect to authentication latencies and the overheads
of chained methods. In brief, the results show that
proactive context transfer and ticket forwarding reduce
the AKA latency to 36.8% and EAP-TLS latency to
23.1% when RTT between visiting and home networks
is 200 ms. Also, the overhead for chained methods was
minimal.
5Note that AKA of 3G differs from EAP-AKA defined in [12]
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1) authentication performance: The measurement re-
sults show that proactive context transfer and ticket
forwarding reduce the AKA latency to 36.8% and EAP-
TLS latency to 23.1% when RTT between visiting and
home networks (FAAA-to-HAAA RTT) is 200 ms. Fig-
ure 13 compares the authentication latencies of tested
algorithms when the destination network is 3G. As seen
in the graph, AKA takes from 297.0 ms up to 463.2 ms
when the FAAA-to-HAAA RTT is from 100 ms to 250
ms, respectively. The bright portion of the bars represent
the time spent for communications beyond the current
network (internetwork traffic). Note that proactive and
ticket methods do not require any internetwork traffic
during the hand-off. As far as authentication latency is
concerned, proactive and ticket method achieve the same
performance.
Figure 14 compares the performance toward WLAN
network. Original EAP-TLS takes from 1238.98 ms up
to 1882.98 ms when FAAA-to-HAAA is 100 ms to 250
ms, respectively. In contrast to AKA, each EAP-TLS
message has to reach the home AAA server, so the
reduction of authentication latency by chained methods
is much more apparent in WLAN.
2) overhead: Proactive context transfer introduces
overhead in the form of wired communications between
AAA servers. The amount of the overhead is a product
of the number of neighbors and the size of context.
Also, the proactive method requires memory for context
caching at the destination network. The duration of such
memory usage should be at least the average internet-
work hand-off interval. For reactive methods, the previ-
ous AAA needs to keep the context of a departed client
long enough so that it can respond to context requests on
behalf of that client. The computation overhead of ticket
forwarding includes the generation and interpretation of
the ticket, which involves shared-key encryption. We
found the ticket generation time on the previous server
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and ticket interpretation time on the destination server to
be less than 1 ms each. Furthermore, ticket forwarding
imposes traffic overhead proportional to the ticket size
(80 bytes for a WLAN ticket, and 32 bytes for a 3G
ticket).
VI. SOFT-PREDICTION OF NEXT NETWORK
As described in section III, the current authentication
server needs to know where to send context before the
client hands off. For this purpose, the authentication
server must either predict the destination network to
which the client will hand off, or predict a set of potential
destination networks. We call this soft-prediction. In
this section, we propose a soft-prediction system using
hierarchical neighbor graph.
A. Neighbor Graphs
Neighbor graph is a dynamic, distributed data struc-
ture that abstracts hand-off relationships between access
points in a WLAN [15] [16]. A neighbor graph is gener-
ated based on continuous observation of actual hand-offs
in the network. When a mobile station hands off from
one access point to another, both access points realize the
hand-off relationship between them. This realization is
possible by IAPP (Inter-Access Point Protocol) defined
in IEEE Draft 802.11f [35]. By observation, each access
point learns and maintains the list of neighbor access
points to which some mobile station has handed off.
The neighbor graph is a distributed data structure
because each access point only stores the local topology.
The distributed nature of neighbor graph guarantees
scalability, minimal memory usage and memory-access
delay. The neighbor graph is dynamic because it can
adapt to the changing mobility patterns of the users. As
the user’s mobility habit changes, the neighbor graph
adds new edges or deletes obsolete edges to more closely
reflect current hand-off relationships.
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Another advantage of neighbor graph is that it pro-
vides a highly accurate method of identifying potential
next access points to which the mobile station will hand
off. Reference [15] shows that neighbor graph provides
an order of magnitude reduction in the layer 2 hand-
off latency incurred by context transfer between old and
new access points. The effect of this approach improves
dramatically as user mobility increases. Reference [9]
shows how neighbor graphs can be utilized to obtain a
99% reduction in authentication time of an IEEE 802.11
hand-off (full EAP-TLS) by proactively distributing nec-
essary key material one hop ahead of the mobile user.
Also reference [16] shows another application of NG, in
which the station can reduce probing latency by up to
84%.
B. Hierarchical Neighbor Graphs
Although NG was originally suggested to be used for
abstracting hand-off relationships inside a network, it
can be extended to the internetwork environment. We
call this internetwork generalization of neighbor graph
Hierarchical Neighbor Graph (HNG).
The following defines the HNG. Let the base neighbor
graph,
NGb = < Vb, Eb >
where Vb = { N1, N2, . . . , Nn } and Eb = { <
Ni, Nj > : a mobile can hand off from Ni to Nj }. Given
a set partition of Vb, {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} where k is the
number of partitions, we can generate another neighbor
graph of higher level,
NGh =< Vh, Eh >
such that Vh = { P1, P2, . . . , Pk } and Eh = { < Pi, Pj >
: there exist U ∈ Pi and V ∈ Pj such that < U, V >∈ Eb
}.
The set of neighbor graphs on different levels defines
a hierarchical neighbor graph, HNG = { NGb, NGh }.
In the 3G/WLAN scenario, each base node Ni rep-
resents an access point in WLAN or a base station in
3G (Fig. 15). A partition is an individual network with
its own authentication system. Thus, Pi represents the
authentication server of the ith network. Although we
define a two level hierarchical neighbor graph for simple
explanation, HNG can easily be expanded to multiple
levels.
By the definition above, NGh and HNG can be gen-
erated from NGb and the set partition. The generation
method inside a network uses inter-AP communication
methods, such as IAPP [35] in [15]. However, we
cannot apply such mechanisms directly to learn an edge
between heterogeneous networks. Since there are no
trivial means of communication between heterogeneous
base nodes (e.g. between WLAN access points and 3G
base stations), the involvement of higher level entities,
i.e. authentication servers, is required in the generation
process.
C. scalability of hierarchical neighbor graph
Since the number of users under a higher level node is
the aggregation of underlying lower level nodes, the scal-
ability problem can be an issue in hierarchical neighbor
graphs. It would be wasteful for a AAA to proactively
transfer contexts to all neighboring AAA’s. To address
this problem, the AAA must be aware of the topology
within the network. In Fig. 15, WLAN has two neighbors
UMTS and CDMA. However, AP 2 has no internetwork
neighbor and AP 1 and AP 3 each have one inter-
network neighbor. Therefore, WLAN-AAA should use
AP’s with internetwork neighbors for proactive caching,
rather than using all AP’s WLAN. For example, when
the mobile station associates to AP 3, WLAN-AAA
should only proactively transfer the context to UMTS.
No context transfer is required for clients under AP 2. In
this way, we can make hierarchical neighbor graph more
scalable by allowing AAA’s to make more informed
decisions about where to send contexts.
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous research on internetwork authentication
mostly involved centralized approaches, where a single
authentication server on the home network authenticates
the client. In such approaches, the basic authentication
model is the following: Assume MS, whose home
network is Nh, is visiting a foreign network Nf . Denote
the authentication servers in Nh and Nf as ASh and
ASf , respectively. Most authentication schemes in such
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environments require the MS to authenticate itself to
ASh through ASf [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [6]. 3G
wireless communication systems such as GSM, UMTS,
and CDMA2000 already have such authentication mech-
anisms in place [29] [17]. Reference [11], [12], and
[36] are adapting 3G-like mechanisms into the WLAN
security using EAP [23] under a AAA framework [22]
[37]. However, these schemes still suffer performance
degradation when there is high latency between the ASf
and ASh.
To reduce the number of messages exchanged be-
tween ASf and ASh, which tend to be located very
far apart, reference [36] and [38] suggest using a 3G
style authentication mechanism by introducing AAA-
broker servers on the path from ASf to ASh. The
limitation of their method is that their framework can
only use simple challenge-response based authentication
protocols. Furthermore, the trust relationships between
all the brokers with home networks faces a scalability
problem.
The number of security associations is another issue in
the wide-area wireless network environment. When for-
eign and home networks collaborate, secure associations
between networks are necessary, resulting in a total of
O(N2) security associations. Reference [10] attempts to
address this problem by introducing a dedicated AAA
server (called the AAA-broker) which maintains the
security associations with all the networks and provides
broker service between foreign and home networks. This
scheme reduces the total number of security associations
down to O(N). However, since one broker handles
all authentication requests, it suffers from a scalability
problem as well as the poor performance caused by
triangular routing via AAA-broker.
Unlike previous approaches, context transfer schemes
can avoid the message exchanges with the home network
during hand-off. Although research about intra-domain
context transfer can be found in literature [39] [40] [15],
to our best knowledge, research on inter-domain context
transfer scheme is rare. Instead of authenticating through
the home network, reference [41] proposed AAA context
transfer between gateways to eliminate the interactions
between mobile host and home AAA server in All-IP
infrastructures. This is a reactive method which happens
after hand-off and it requires modifications at routers.
Also, the context simply consists of session keys, and
the strongest of trust relationships is required between
networks.
[25] and [28] have proposed a different method of
delivering context to next network: let the client forward
the context. Kerberos [25] uses an access grant ticket
for this purpose whereas [28] uses a cookie. Kerberos
is a distributed authentication service that allows a
client to prove its identity to a server, called verifier,
without sending data across the network [42]. Rather
than sending data directly to the next network, the
authentication server issues the client a ticket which
carries the new session key and expiration time to be
used in the next network. The authentication server
signs the ticket itself and encrypts it by a secret key
shared with the next network. However, Kerberos is
another form of centralized authentication because the
home authentication server should get involved in the
issuance of tickets, and the client needs a ticket for
every network it visits. Furthermore, the weakness of the
Kerberos password system is identified in [43]. In this
paper, we show that moving the ticket issuance authority
from the home network to the previous visiting network
constitutes a chained authentication method. Single sign-
on (SSO) scheme [28] enables users to access multiple
systems with single authentication, but it is limited to
web-based authentication using cookies.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we defined chained internetwork au-
thentication schemes as distributed methods in which
the authentication at each visiting network relies on the
established security association in the previous visiting
network. We emphasized that chained authentication
methods can achieve efficiency and security at the same
time. Their distributed characteristics also reduce the
required trust relationships throughout wide area wireless
networks to O(N), where N is the number of networks.
Our experiments showed that proactive context transfer
and ticket forwarding reduced the 3G authentication
latency to 36.8% and WLAN EAP-TLS latency to 23.1%
when RTT between visiting and home networks is 200
ms. The performance benefit of such schemes grow as
the distance to home network increases.
For proactive context transfer to be a scalable and
feasible solution, more investigation about the soft-
prediction scheme is needed. The optimization of HNG
under heterogeneous environments is to be studied and
manifested. Furthermore, the derivative problems from
chained authentication, such as accounting, the use of
multi-homed clients, and mixture of centralized and
chained methods will be studied.
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